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Highlights 
• Even though it has been neglected, the study of viruses raises important philosophical 
questions. 
• Questions about viruses (definition, classification, etc.) can be related to classic issues 
in philosophy of biology and general philosophy. 
• The contributions gathered in this special issue address these questions in different and 
sometimes conflicting ways. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Viruses have been virtually absent from philosophy of biology. This is a quite surprising 
situation, because viruses probably constitute the most abundant and diverse biological 
entities in nature (Rohwer & Barott, 2013; Wasik & Turner, 2013). Viruses also successfully 
occupy a wide range of niches, are key players in evolutionary and ecological processes 
(Villarreal 2005; Wasik and Turner 2013), and, last but not least, have long been a matter of 
concern to medical doctors and epidemiologists. The situation is even more astonishing 
considering that several biologists have, over the years, produced a rich conceptual reflection 
on viruses (e.g., Burnet, 1945; Claverie & Abergel, 2010, 2012; Forterre, 2010a; Koonin & 
Dolja, 2013; López-García, 2012; Lwoff, 1957; Moreira & López-García, 2009; Raoult & 
Forterre, 2008; Stanley, 1957; Van Regenmortel, 2003), and the philosophy of microbiology 
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more broadly has blossomed in recent years (O’Malley, 2013, 2014; O’Malley & Dupré, 
2007a, 2007b). Meanwhile, both virologists and historians of biology have produced a 
detailed and rich history of virology (e.g., Bos, 1999, 2000; Creager, 2002; Hughes, 1977; 
Lustig & Levine, 1992; Sankaran, 2010; Summers, 2014; van Helvoort, 1994a, 1994b, 1996; 
Waterson & Wilkinson, 1978)1.  
Naturally, there have been important exceptions to the near absence of viruses from 
the domain of philosophy of biology, in particular the work of Gregory Morgan (Morgan, 
2001, 2006, 2010; Morgan & Pitts, 2008), as well as a few other contributions by 
philosophers, or appearing in philosophical journals (e.g., Rohwer & Barott, 2013; Witzany, 
2012). Yet it seems fair to say that, overall, the philosophy of virology has remained rather 
inchoate in recent years, at least in comparison with other branches of philosophy of biology. 
To our knowledge, the present issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences is the first special issue of a history and philosophy of science journal 
specifically devoted to philosophical analyses of viruses. Now, in our view, it is all the more 
important to pay attention to viruses as their study raises crucial conceptual and philosophical 
questions – in addition to practical questions already discussed extensively in the medias (for 
example, recently, about Ebola and Zika viruses). In this editorial introduction, we mention 
some of these conceptual and philosophical questions, and show how the essays gathered in 
this special issue address them. 
 
2. Philosophical questions raised by the study of viruses 
The study of viruses raises pressing conceptual and philosophical questions, several of which 
can be directly related to classic issues in philosophy of biology, or even general philosophy. 
With no claims to exhaustiveness, we mention here six problems that seem to us of great 
philosophical significance. As suggested by Table 1, a first general problem, “What are 
viruses?” can be divided into three more specific problems (definition; individuality; 
taxonomy), while a second general problem, “What is the place of viruses in the biological 
world?” can be divided into three other specific problems (life; organismality; non-living 
biological roles). 
                                                
1 This historical work has led to important discussions and controversies. On the tensions and disagreements 
among historical accounts of virology, see Méthot, this special issue. 
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Problems for virology and philosophy of virology 
Problems for philosophy of 
biology and general philosophy 
What are viruses? 
1. How to define a virus? 
Are definitions useful in science, 
and how are they constructed? 
2. Individuality and diachronic 
identity: where and when a 
virus starts and ends? 
What is a biological individual 
and what makes its identity 
through time? 
3. What is a virus species? 
What is a biological species? 
What are “natural kinds” in 
biology? 
What is the place 
of viruses in the 
biological world? 
4. Are viruses alive? What is life? 
5. Is a virus an organism? What is an organism? 
6. Whether or not considered 
living, what are the biological 
(especially evolutionary and 
ecological) roles of viruses? 
How to articulate the biological 
and the “living” dimensions? How 
biotic and abiotic elements 
interact and what can be the 
impact of the latter on living 
processes? 
Table 1. 
 
 
2.1. What are viruses? 
Perhaps the most basic and essential problem raised by virus research concerns the definition 
of the concept of virus. Indeed, this seemingly naïve question has always been a crucial 
concern for virologists (Summers, 2014). Though some people include viruses in a very 
general category of “microbes”, others consider that viruses are very different from microbes. 
Historically, at the time of what is often described as their discovery at the end of the 19th 
century, viruses were conceived of as infectious agents that pass through a Chamberland-
Pasteur filter, that is, a filter that blocks bacterial agents. In other words, viruses were mainly 
distinguished from bacteria by their filterability (van Helvoort, 1996). More than half a 
century later, in his highly influential paper “The Concept of Virus”, André Lwoff famously 
claimed that “viruses are viruses” – a way of stressing “the nature of the difference between 
viruses and other infectious agents, between viruses and micro-organisms” (Lwoff, 1957, p. 
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240). In his Nobel lecture in 1965, Lwoff still insisted that there is an “essential difference” 
between a virus and a microbe, a virus being defined by its capacity to reproduce itself solely 
from its genetic material (Lwoff, 1966). As has often been emphasized (Summers, 2014; 
Claverie & Abergel, this special issue), viruses have most of the time been defined negatively: 
viruses are conceived as entities lacking this or that feature (e.g., metabolism or autonomous 
replication) found in other biological entities, especially bacteria, and it is clearly worth 
asking whether a positive definition of viruses can be offered.  
Today, some biologists (e.g., Claverie and Abergel, Forterre, and Koonin and 
Starokadomskyy, this special issue) consider that several of the criteria traditionally used to 
separate viruses from other biological entities have become fragile, or even sometimes 
obsolete. One aspect of this concerns the degree of “autonomy” exhibited by viruses. A very 
influential definition of viruses has been that viruses are intracellular obligate parasites, with a 
strong emphasis on their dependency on a host. Yet, the recent understanding that symbioses 
are ubiquitous in nature, added to the realization that at least certain viruses exhibit some 
degree of autonomy (Claverie & Abergel, 2010) while many bacteria live as obligate 
parasites, has led some biologists to adopt a much more continuous view of autonomy among 
biological entities. According to this view, far from distinguishing, in a absolute way, 
dependent from independent biological entities, the only thing one can do is to distinguish 
degrees of autonomy in the biological world (e.g., Dupré & O’Malley, 2009; Claverie & 
Abergel 2012).  
A related question is whether or not viruses are necessarily harmful. Viruses have 
generally been described as harmful (most often disease-causing, that is, pathogenic) entities, 
and it is undeniably true that some viruses can be devastating to their hosts. Nonetheless, 
recent research has shown that many viruses are neutral or even beneficial to their hosts (see 
Pradeu, as well as Dupré & Guttinger, this special issue), so harmfulness could hardly be a 
defining feature of viruses.  
Taken together, these observations suggest that it is today both crucial and at the same 
time extremely difficult to offer a precise and distinctive definition of the notion of virus. In 
this context, contributions to this special issue raise significant problems, such as to what 
extent a general definition of virus is possible, whether definitions of virus should necessarily 
be negative (i.e., descriptions of what viruses lack as compared to other biological entities), 
what definition of viruses could be compatible with scenarios that give an important role to 
viruses in the origins of life (Forterre and Kostyrka, this special issue), and what kind of new 
conceptual distinctions could perhaps shed light on future virological research (e.g., Forterre 
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suggests the distinction between “ribocells” and “virocells”; Claverie and Abergel offer a 
definition of a virus as any biological entity the genome of which is replicated by a system of 
macromolecules that it does not entirely encode, and disseminated using a metabolically inert 
structure the maintenance of which does not require energy; Koonin and Starokadomskyy 
propose to distinguish different forms and degrees of “replicators”, and conceive lytic viruses 
as extreme selfish replicators; in contrast, van Regenmortel defends a more “orthodox” view 
on viruses, which according to him is shared by a majority of virologists). 
 A second major set of problems concerns the individuality and diachronic identity of a 
virus. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to determine where and when a virus starts and ends, 
and what it means for one virus to remain the same through time. These seemingly 
philosophical and rather abstract questions are in fact related to a very practical issue, 
regularly met by working virologists: is a virus the viral particle (the virion), or is it the whole 
viral cycle? (See Figure 1). Although every virologist takes into account the whole cycle of a 
virus in order to describe its features and explain how it works, many statements made by 
virologists about viruses suggest that their focus is most often the virion. For example, two of 
the traditional criteria of Lwoff, according to which typical cellular organisms contain both 
DNA and RNA while viruses only contain one type, and all microorganisms are reproduced 
from the integrated sum of their constituents while viruses are produced solely from their 
nucleic acid, make sense only if the virus is identified with the virion. Many contributors to 
this special issue raise the problem mentioned here, and the reader will find strong 
disagreements between them (see, in particular, Claverie and Abergel, Dupré and Guttinger, 
Forterre, van Regenmortel, this special issue). 
 The discussion as to whether the virus should be equated with the virion or the whole 
viral cycle also has significant ontological consequences. In a series of recent publication, 
Dupré has been arguing in favour of a process-based, rather than thing-based, biological 
ontology, suggesting that what is prior in the biological world is change, not stability (see 
Dupré, 2012 for an overview). Viruses might offer a very convincing example in favour of 
this view, both because considering viruses as processes seems to be a good way to properly 
take into account the whole viral life cycle, and because the choice between defining viruses 
as virions or as whole life cycles has important practical consequences on some controversies 
of direct interest to virologists, such as the possibility to say that viruses might have 
metabolism after all (Dupré and Guttinger, this special issue; see also Claverie and Abergel, 
this special issue). 
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Figure 1. Highly schematic and simplified representation of a viral cycle. 
(1) The virion (virus particle) attaches to the host cell. (2) The virion enters the cytoplasm via endocytosis, and is 
then uncoated. (3) In the nucleus, viral nucleic acid is replicated, and newly synthesized viral messenger RNAs 
migrate to the cytoplasm, where they are translated into viral proteins. (4) The newly formed virions bud from 
the infected cell and are released, sometimes killing the host cell. The actual details of the cycle vary 
considerably depending on the type of virus; the present figure offers only a schematic and oversimplified view. 
 
 
Problems regarding biological individuality and identity, including about where and 
when biological entities start and end, have been highly debated in philosophy of biology. 
They have been raised about a large diversity of living things, including plants, fungi, colonial 
and social organisms, as well as symbiotic associations (Bouchard & Huneman, 2013; Buss, 
1987; Godfrey-Smith, 2009; Michod, 1999; Pradeu, 2012), but, in light of the discussions 
presented in this special issue, viruses could constitute a particularly challenging “borderline” 
case for those problems, and one that could be particularly useful to discuss for philosophers 
of biology. 
A third problem is how to classify viruses and whether or not it is possible to define 
viral species. Determining what counts as one species in the world of microbes is already a 
difficult task (O’Malley, 2014, p. 45-94), as recognized early by key actors in the debate over 
the definition of biological species (Mayr, 1953). But establishing a viral taxonomy is even 
more challenging. In the 1990s, especially under the influence of van Regenmortel (1989), the 
International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) developed a phylogenetic 
approach to viruses, in contrast with previous classifications, which were mainly based on 
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structural characteristics of viruses (see also van Regenmortel, 2003). Nevertheless, as shown 
by Morgan (this special issue), this phylogenetic approach faces many challenges, in 
particular the possibility of extensive horizontal gene transfers (HGTs) among viruses. This 
suggests that, instead of a tree-like structure, the history of viruses is better represented by a 
reticulated network, and that only a pluralistic approach to virus taxonomy may be 
satisfactory. 
 
2.2. What is the place of viruses in the biological world? 
The question “Are viruses alive?” has been raised repeatedly throughout the history of 
virological research. Of course, this question is directly related to another question, “What is 
life?”. Answering this question is notoriously difficult, and it has often been emphasized that 
conceptions of life have regularly changed in the last decades, making any answer to this 
question even more delicate. Of course, one possibility is to examine the distinction between 
the living and the non-living from a historical point of view, by characterizing the origins of 
life, but this is also a very arduous task (Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1999).  
Recently, several biologists have claimed that a series of new discoveries, primarily the 
discovery of a growing number of “giant” viruses (viruses visible under the light microscope, 
often with a large double-stranded DNA genome, and a large gene content) since 2003 (La 
Scola et al., 2008), had the potential to radically modify our views about the living or non-
living status of viruses (mainly because it has become very difficult to draw a boundary 
between some cellular organisms strongly dependent on their host and harbouring less than a 
minimal genome and the giant viruses that encode many genes and exhibit some degree of 
autonomy (Claverie & Abergel, 2010; this special issue)) and/or the role viruses could have 
played in the origins of life (Forterre, 2010b; Raoult & Forterre, 2008). These views have 
been met with scepticism by many other virologists (López-García, 2012; López-García & 
Moreira, 2012; Moreira & López-García, 2009), giving rise to a strong controversy (see, e.g., 
(Villarreal, 2004), (Villarreal & Witzany, 2010); see also Claverie and Abergel, Forterre, as 
well as van Regenmortel, this special issue). 
A related problem is to determine to what extent viruses could be considered as 
organisms (with the thought that all organisms are living things but not all living things are 
organisms). The answer to this question will naturally depend on the definition of organism 
one adopts, but many biologists, for several of the reasons mentioned above such as the 
dependency on a host and the absence of an autonomous metabolism, have considered that 
viruses were not organisms. The notion of organism is usually considered as more precise 
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than the wider notion of a living thing, because it is associated with the idea of a very high 
degree of functional organization and cooperation, with strong interactions among parts (e.g., 
Huneman, 2006; Pradeu, 2010; Sober, 2000). From that point of view, the suggestion that 
viruses might belong to the category of organisms after all is surprising, but some contributors 
to this special issue do examine it, if somewhat marginally2. 
Some people, however, doubt that the question “Are viruses alive?” (and the question 
“Are viruses organisms?”) is a crucial one, whether because they think the discrimination 
between the living and the non-living does not fit well the specific case of viruses, or that this 
question is altogether ill-conceived. To a large extent, the answer to the question whether 
viruses are alive will depend on the pre-existing conceptions of “life” of each participant in 
the debate. In particular, those who see life first and foremost as a metabolic process tend to 
exclude viruses from the living world, while those who see life as primarily an evolutionary 
process are much more prone to say that viruses belong to the living world. Yet, even those 
sceptical of the question of the living status of viruses usually consider that the wider issue of 
the place of viruses in the biological world is worth exploring. Indeed, regardless of their 
inclusion or exclusion from the category of living things, viruses necessarily appear as major 
biological entities from several key points of view. They are Darwinian entities, replicating 
themselves, and subject to evolutionary processes such as natural selection and drift, while in 
turn exerting selective pressure on their hosts. They are also involved in fundamental 
ecological processes (see O’Malley, this special issue), for example in marine food webs 
(Rohwer & Thurber, 2009). All this suggests that the question of what viruses do (the 
different evolutionary, ecological, and physiological phenomena in which they are involved) 
is in fact at least as important as the question of what they are (that is, their living or non-
living status).  
 
Thus, the study of viruses raises fundamental issues, having to do with the definition of 
life, biological individuality and identity, the notion of organism, and the ontology of living 
things or processes. In this context, it seems urgent for philosophers of biology – and perhaps 
even for all philosophers – to start paying attention to viruses. This integration of viruses into 
philosophy of biology will certainly be facilitated by the remarkably rich conceptual 
reflection built by virologists themselves over the years and the welcome inclination of many 
                                                
2 Forterre (this special issue) explores arguments that have to do with the degree of organization of some viruses 
in the “virocell” stage (see also (Raoult & Forterre, 2008)), while Pradeu (this special issue) mentions the 
possibility that even viruses might possess an immune system, a feature that could perhaps be associated with the 
category of organism. 
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of them to interact with philosophers, as exemplified by this special issue, but also previous 
publications (e.g., Claverie & Abergel, 2012; López-García, 2012; Rohwer & Barott, 2013). 
 
3. Structure of this special issue 
To address the conceptual and philosophical problems raised by present-day virology, the 
present special issue gathers the contributions of biologists, philosophers, and historians. 
When we solicited papers from biologists, our aim has been to focus on controversial 
discussions occurring in present-day virology rather than more consensual points. As a 
consequence, several papers of this special issue express strong personal views, which are not 
necessarily shared by, and representative of, virologists in general, and all readers should be 
aware that they will not find here any neutral and consensual description of the current state 
of virology research, but rather a reflection of the often confrontational debates that have 
animated that field in recent years. 
The special issue starts with the contribution of Gregory J. Morgan (Stevens Institute 
of Technology, USA) who, as emphasized above, is probably the only philosopher of biology 
whose recent research has dealt specifically with viruses. Morgan asks what a virus species is, 
and defends what he calls a “radical Pluralism” in viral taxonomy. He reconstructs the history 
of virus classification since early attempts in the 1960s, showing how virologists have moved 
from phenetic to an increasingly evolutionary approach to virus species, with the current 
International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) defining viral species in terms 
of monophyly. Morgan rejects the latter view, arguing that the existence of extensive 
horizontal genetic transfer (HGT) among various groups of viruses presents a challenge to 
this definition. To avoid the difficulties met by past approaches, Morgan defends a radical 
pluralism, which says that some viruses can be members of more than one species, while 
others do not form species at all and should be classified using new reticulate categories. 
Maureen O’Malley (University of Bordeaux, France) shows that, since the late 1980s, 
a growing stream of micrographic, experimental, molecular, and model-based (theoretical) 
research has been investigating how and why viruses should be understood as important 
ecological actors. Viruses, especially phage, participate in the planet’s most crucial food 
webs. They also constitute regulators of planetary biogeochemistry, controlling cycles on 
which all life depends (carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus). O’Malley argues that viruses are 
probably ecological actors of equal in importance to organismal actors, and that ecological 
agency should therefore be distinguished from standard interpretations of biological agency. 
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Thomas Pradeu (CNRS & University of Bordeaux, France) shows that, although 
viruses have generally been characterized by their harmful effects, many examples of 
mutualistic viruses (i.e. viruses that can increase the host fitness) exist. He explains how the 
idea of mutualistic viruses has been defended in recent virology, and explores four conceptual 
and practical consequences, asking to what extent this research modifies the way scientists 
might search for new viruses, our notion of how the host immune system interacts with 
microbes, the development of new therapeutic approaches, and, finally, the role played by the 
criterion of autonomy in our understanding of living things. He concludes that the recognition 
of mutualistic viruses plays a major role in a wider ongoing revision of the concept of virus. 
Jean-Michel Claverie and Chantal Abergel (University of Mediterranée School of 
Medicine, France) use the epistemological approach of Gaston Bachelard – especially his idea 
that the advancement of science is often made through the breaking of “epistemological 
barriers” – to shed light on the reasons why the discovery of giant viruses occurred only in 
2003, even though everything had been in place for their identification for over a century. 
Mimivirus was discovered in 2003, quickly followed by the identification of unrelated 
families of giant viruses such as the Pandoraviruses, the Pithoviruses and most recently 
Mollivirus, eliciting many questions about the definition of viruses and the exact nature of 
their differences with bacteria. Claverie and Abergel examine to what extent the giant viruses 
challenge previous definitions of viruses, the diversity of forms they can take, and how they 
might have evolved from extinct ancestral cellular lineages.  They offer a new definition of 
viruses, which emphasizes that they do not encode a single universally shared macromolecule 
or biochemical function. 
Patrick Forterre (Institut Pasteur & Paris-Sud University, France) argues that during 
the last decades three major discoveries have profoundly modified our perception of the viral 
world: (i) molecular ecologists have shown that viral particles are more abundant than cells in 
all environments; (ii) structural biologists have shown that some viruses from the three 
domains of life, Bacteria, Eukarya and Archaea, are evolutionarily related, revealing that 
viruses have most likely predated the last universal common ancestor, LUCA, and (iii) 
microbiologists have discovered giant viruses that rival cells in terms of size and gene 
content. Forterre discusses the scientific and philosophical impact of these discoveries on the 
debates over the definition, nature (living or not), and origin of viruses. He suggests that, even 
though viruses have often been considered non-living because they are traditionally 
assimilated to their virions, the term “virus” actually describes a biological process that 
integrates all aspects of the viral reproduction cycle. He insists on the importance of the 
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intracellular part of this cycle, what he calls “virocell”, when the viral information is actively 
expressed and reproduced, allowing the emergence of new viral genes. He claims that the 
virocell concept theoretically removes roadblocks that prevent defining viruses as living 
organisms, while admitting that defining a “living organism” remains an outstanding 
challenge. He concludes by offering new clues to address the question of what viruses are and 
whether or not they can be considered as living entities. 
John Dupré and Stephan Guttinger (University of Exeter, UK) suggest that the 
conception of life as composed of distinct entities with well-defined boundaries has been 
undermined in recent years by the realisation of the near omnipresence of symbiosis. This has 
not only presented severe problems for our traditional understanding of biological 
individuality but has also led some to claim that we need to switch to a process ontology to be 
able adequately to understand biological systems. They note, however, that a large group of 
biological entities has been excluded from these discussions, namely viruses. Dupré and 
Guttinger develop two lines of argument to show that, despite common belief, viruses fit well 
with the integrated and collaborative picture of nature implied by symbiosis. First, viruses can 
be “nice” and collaborate with their hosts, meaning that they form parts of integrated 
biological systems and processes. Second, there are various reasons why viruses should be 
seen as processes rather than things, or substances. They conclude with some reflections on 
the debate as to whether viruses should be seen as living, and argue that there are good 
reasons for an affirmative answer to this question. 
Marc van Regenmortel (CNRS & University of Strasbourg, France) argues that the 
idea that viruses are living is no more than a metaphor. He suggests that virologists often use 
anthropomorphic metaphors to describe vividly the properties of viruses and this has led some 
of them to claim that viruses are living microorganisms. The discovery of giant viruses that 
are larger and have a more complex genome than small bacteria has fostered the interpretation 
that viral factories, which are the compartments in virus-infected cells where the virus is 
being replicated, are able to transform themselves into a new type of living viral organism 
called a “virocell” (see Raoult & Forterre, 2008 and Forterre, this special issue). Van 
Regenmortel strongly rejects the concept of the living virocell, suggesting that it is based on 
an over-literal interpretation of a series of metaphors. First, because of the widespread 
occurrence of horizontal gene transfer, endosymbiosis and hybridization in the evolution of 
viral genomes, he suggests that it has not been possible to include metaphorical virocells in 
the so-called Tree of Life, which itself is a metaphor. Van Regenmortel also rejects the 
metaphor according to which a viral infection process should be seen as a war between host 
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and virus, with the underlying idea that a virus such as the human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV) would be able to develop new strategies and mechanisms for escaping protective host 
immune responses. He concludes by distinguishing two types of metaphors used for 
describing the behaviour of viruses: an “intentionality metaphor” commonly used for 
attributing goals and intentions to organisms, and the “living virus” metaphor that considers 
viruses to be actually living organisms. 
Eugene V. Koonin (National Institutes of Health, USA) & Petro Starokadomskyy (UT 
Southwestern Medical Center, USA) offer a replicator-based approach to viruses. Indeed, they 
claim that the question whether viruses are alive, despite the considerable debate it has caused 
over many years, is in fact without substance, because the answer depends entirely on a 
definition of life bound to be arbitrary. In contrast, they suggest, the status of viruses among 
biological entities is readily defined within the replicator paradigm. They develop a view in 
which all biological replicators form a continuum along the selfishness-cooperativity axis, 
from the completely selfish to fully cooperative forms, and, within this range, typical lytic 
viruses represent the selfish extreme, whereas temperate viruses and various mobile elements 
occupy positions closer to the middle of the range. Selfish replicators not only belong to the 
biological realm, but are intrinsic to any evolving system of replicators. No such system can 
evolve without the emergence of parasites, and moreover, parasites drive the evolution of 
biological complexity at multiple levels. Koonin and Starokadomskyy argue that the history 
of life is a story of parasite-host coevolution that includes both incessant arms races and 
various forms of cooperation, and all organisms are communities of interacting, coevolving 
replicators of different classes. They conclude by saying that, even though a complete theory 
of replicator coevolution remains to be developed, it appears likely that not only the 
differentiation between selfish and cooperative replicators but the emergence of the entire 
range of replication strategies, from selfish to cooperative, is intrinsic to biological evolution. 
Gladys Kostyrka (CNRS & Paris 1 University, France) examines from a historical 
point of view the problem of how viruses could have played critical roles in the origin of life 
if life relies on cellular organization and if viruses are defined as intracellular obligate 
parasites. How could viruses play a role in the emergence of cellular life if the existence of 
cells is a prerequisite for the existence of viruses? Building on the work of historian of science 
Scott Podolsky, Kostyrka argues that disagreements concerning the roles of viruses in origin 
of life scenarios stem from the different concepts of life and of virus that various scientists 
defend, and that investigating the roles of viruses in these scenarios not only helps to identify 
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different ways of defining life in the context of origin of life theorizing, but also offers the 
opportunity to better understand how viruses could be conceptualized. 
Finally, Pierre-Olivier Méthot (Université Laval, Canada) offers an analysis of the 
recent historiography of virology. Whereas aspects of the history of virology from the late 
nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century have often been recounted through a number of 
detailed case studies, very few general discussions of the historiography of this discipline 
have been offered. Looking at the different ways in which the history of virology has been 
told, Méthot discusses a number of debates among and sometimes between scientists and 
historians of biology and examines how they are based on a different understanding of notions 
such as “discipline”, of processes such as “scientific discovery” as well as on distinct views 
about what the history of science is and how it should be written (particularly the opposition 
between “longue durée” and “micro-history” or between history of “concepts” versus 
“experimental methods”). This analysis suggests that one way to provide a richer 
historiography of virology would be to look at the variations over time of the relations 
between conceptual, technological, and institutional factors that fostered its development at 
the intersection of several other scientific fields in the life sciences.    
 
 Hopefully this special issue will contribute to the emergence of a fully grown 
philosophy of virology. Because of the very peculiar place viruses have in the biological 
world, philosophy of virology is interesting in its own right. Moreover, philosophy of 
virology will be a welcome and very useful addition to the increasingly well-established field 
of philosophy of microbiology. Finally, the issues raised by virology, in particular the 
definition of life, individual, organism and autonomy, appear to be of central interest for any 
philosopher of biology, and even perhaps for any philosopher more generally. As editors, we 
will be delighted if some readers find that seeing those traditional philosophical questions 
through viral lens brings novel and important insights. 
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